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We examine how protection in LDCs affects welfare in other countries whose economic 
circumstances are similar. Theoretical analysis suggests the effects may be positive or negative. 
Analysis of data on protection in nine selected LDCs showed positive correlations among 
patterns of protection and trade, but a tendency for greater protection against the exports of 
other LDCs than against developed countries. To evaluate the general equilibrium economic 
effects involved, we used the Michigan Computational Model of World Production and Trade. 
The results showed positive terms-of-trade effects on other countries within the LDC sample 
group and negative effects for may DCs. However, the terms-of-trade improvement was very 
small and cannot be expected to outweigh the efficiency losses of protection within the LDCs 
themselves. 
1. Introduction 
Analyses of tariffs and other forms of protection have focused mainly on 
their effects on the protecting country. In two-country models there has been 
some attention to effects on the other country, but this is equivalent to 
looking at effects on the rest of the world as a whole. Except in the customs 
union literature where the issues in any case are different, there has been 
little attention to the effects that a country's protection may have on 
individual foreign countries that make up only a part of the rest of the 
world. In this paper we address this issue, looking specifically at the effects 
that levels of protection in developing countries may have on other countries 
in their economic 'neighborhood' - that is, countries whose economic 
circumstances are s imi la r  to their own. 
The issue is potentially of great importance, The successes of some 
developing countries in recent years, together with the overall growth of 
populations even in the less successful ones, have expanded their importance 
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in international trade. 1 In addition, empirical evidence suggests that there has 
been a noteworthy increase in intra-LDC trade, in manufactures especially. 
Yet most LDCs have remained outside the international negotiating frame- 
work that has reduced tariffs among developed countries. In addition, 
LDCs have always made extensive use of non-tariff barriers (NTBs), and 
these too restrict the access of international trade to their markets. The 
question then arises whether all of this LDC protection, in addition to 
having the own-country effects that have long been familiar in the tariff 
literature, have additional adverse or beneficial consequences for LDCs as a 
group when one takes into account these neighborhood effects. 
To examine this issue, we introduce a simple theoretical framework in 
section 2 in which three countries produce and trade three goods, and the 
effect of one's tariffs on another depends on the particular patterns of 
specialization and trade that occur. It is seen that one country's tariff may 
have either beneficial or harmful effects on other particular countries, 
depending essentially on whether the other country's pattern of trade and 
protection is similar to its own. 
Since our theoretical analysis suggests that the neighborhood effects of 
protection may be either positive or negative, we turn in the remainder of the 
paper to empirical analysis of the issue. We base this empirical analysis on a 
sample of data on protection in nine developing countries, which we call the 
'focus countries'. While these particular data are neither very recent, nor at 
all comprehensive, they still may be representative of the patterns of 
protection that exist in LDCs. Also, since the data for some of the focus 
countries implicitly include effects of NTBs, our analysis is suggestive of the 
effects of these as well. In section 3 we introduce and explain how we have 
adapted the data for comparability. 
In section 4 we analyze what these data imply about the neighborhood 
effects of protection by means of correlations, both among the protection 
levels themselves and among trade patterns for the countries involved. Then 
we look at the different implications of these levels of protection for other 
LDCs and for selected developed countries as well, by calculating various 
weighted averages of protection that are relevant for the different trading 
partners. 
The problem with looking just at the data themselves is that they are 
indicative of the most direct effects that protection may have and cannot 
even begin to capture the host of indirect effects that may occur in a general 
equilibrium system. A complete analysis thus requires an explicit general 
1For example, considering only the 16 LDCs that are included in the Michigan model which 
we will be reporting on below, these countries accounted for over half of the world's total 
employment and more than 10 percent of world output and trade in 1976. Thus while 
individually most of them are very small, collectively they bulk as large in world markets as 
almost any of the larger developed countries. 
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equilibrium model, and we therefore devote the remainder of the paper to an 
analysis of neighborhood effects of protection using the Michigan com- 
putable model of world production and trade. 
The model itself is described only briefly in section 5, since it has been 
extensively documented elsewhere. Then in section 6 we report the results of 
using the model to calculate the effects of the developing country protection 
levels introduced in section 3. Since our theoretical analysis in section 2 
turned heavily on the terms-of-trade effects of protection, we concentrate on 
our model's calculations of changes in the terms of trade of various countries 
due to the focus countries' levels of protection. We conclude in section 7, 
summarizing our results, but also noting some reservations that we have 
concerning them. 
2. Theoretical considerations 
The effects of one country's protection on the welfare of another depend 
solely on the price effects involved. The benefit that a country derives from 
trade depends on the world prices at which it trades and on the efficiency 
with which its producers and consumers respond to those prices. The latter 
can be reduced by the country's own trade policies, but not by the policies of 
other countries. 2 Since such foreign policies affect a country only through 
their effects on world prices, what we are really talking about are terms,of- 
trade effects. That is, protection in one country improves welfare in another 
to the extent that it raises the price of the latter's exports relative to its 
imports. 
In a two country model, there is a strong presumption in one direction 
concerning the effects of a tariff on the terms of trade. Barring exceptional 
circumstances, a tariff reduces a country's demand for imports and also, after 
various general equilibrium adjustments, its supply of exports. Both changes 
work in the direction of raising the world price of its exports relative to its 
imports. In a two country model, since each country's exports are the other's 
imports, a country's tariff thus worsens the terms of trade of its (only) 
trading partner. There are numerous exceptions to this result in the trade 
theory literature, but interest in them derives largely from the fact that they 
are indeed exceptional. We will not be concerned accordingly with these 
exceptions and will assume instead that protection tends to improve the 
terms of trade of the protecting country. 
In a world of more than two countries, however, the effect on the terms of 
trade of the protecting country tells little about the effect on any individual 
Country elsewhere in the world. It is possible, in general, that some countries 
2This may seem to assume that the revenues or rents due to protection are captured solely 
within the protecting country, ruling out such policies as voluntary export restraints (VERs), but 
this is not the case. VERs generate rents for exporters precisely because of higher export prices. 
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share exactly the same trading pattern as the protecting country itself, and, if 
so, then these countries share in the improvement of the protecting country's 
terms of trade. This could obviously not be true of all other countries in the 
world, but it could be true of a large enough number of countries to be 
important. In particular, if we focus on countries at a similar stage of 
development, that very similarity may well suggest similarity in trade pattern. 
This might therefore lead to a presumption that the neighborhood effects of 
protection, as we use the term here, would be positive. 
To see these possibilities more clearly, consider a model of three countries, 
A, B, and C, producing and trading three goods, X, Y, and Z. Suppose that, 
aside from its dimensionality, the model satisfies the conventional assump- 
tions of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of international trade. That is, produc- 
tion functions display constant returns to scale, all markets are perfectly 
competitive, and so on. Let there be two factors of production, capital and 
labor, from which all three goods are produced, and assume that factor 
prices are not equalized internationally. 3 It follows that prior to protection 
countries are completely specialized in production, in this case meaning that 
no two countries produce more than one good in common. What happens 
when protection is introduced, then, depends on what the particular pattern 
of specialization happens to be. 
Two such patterns suffice to illustrate the possibilities, and are shown in 
fig. 1, panels (a) and (b). Regarding factor endowments, suppose that country 
A is the most developed of the three countries and country C the least, as 
measured by their ratios of capital to labor. Suppose also that good X is the 
most capital intensive in its production, while good Z is the least. 
The one possibility, if the two LDCs are relatively small in terms of their 
total capacities to produce, is that both will specialize in producing the least 
capital intensive good, Z, and will export it to A in exchange for both X and 
Y This is the pattern of specialization shown in fig. l a, where the crosses 
indicate which goods are produced, and therefore exported, by each country. 
A second possibility is shown in fig. lb. Here, the LDCs, B and C, are 
somewhat larger (or perhaps the world demands for Y and Z are smaller) so 
that together they can satisfy world demands for both Y and Z. However, 
because of the assumption that factor prices are not equalized, both countries 
will not produce both goods, and we have selected instead the case in which 
each produces only one. In accordance with the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, 
we have the least capital-abundant country, C, specializing in the least 
capital-intensive good, Z. Clearly, many other patterns of specialization are 
possible, including those in which particular goods are produced in more 
3As is well known, factor prices would be equalized in such a model if trade were perfectly 
free and if countries' factor endowments were not too diverse. In dealing with the wide range of 
developed and developing countries, we find these assumptions implausible and, following 
Krueger (1977) and Deardorff (1979), prefer to assume internationally unequal factor prices. 


















Fig. 1. Patterns of specialization. Countries are ranked by state of development, with A highest 
and C lowest. Goods are ranked by capital intensity, with X highest and Z lowest. The crosses 
indicate patterns of specialization and exports. 
than one country. But the two patterns in fig. 1 serve well to indicate what 
will happen when protection is introduced, since the patterns of trade, as well 
as specialization, are evident. 
What then happens when one of the LDCs, say country C, introduces a 
tariff, and what in particular is the effect on its economic 'neighbor', country 
B? 
In case (a) the answer is likely to be unambiguous, but is opposite to that 
alluded to above for the two country model. Since both B and C export Z 
and import X and Y, an improvement in the protecting country's terms of 
trade will also benefit its neighbor. That is, when C levies tariffs on X and/or 
Y, its demand for one or both of these goods will be reduced. Also, it will 
now offer less of its export good, Z, in exchange for what it imports, and this 
will reduce the supply of Z on the world market. Thus the price of Z relative 
to X and Y will tend to rise. This is not absolutely necessary, but as noted 
above, we will assume that protection always improves the protecting 
country's terms of trade. In this case, since B and C share qualitatively 
identical trade patterns, price changes that improve the terms of trade for C 
will also tend to do so for B. Thus here the neighborhood effects of 
protection are most likely positive. 4 
"Again this is not absolutely necessary. If B and C have different preferences and thus import 
X and Y in different proportions, then other outcomes are possible in special circumstances. For 
example, a tariff on only X, if X and Y are close substitutes in C, could merely shift demand 
toward Y and raise its price. If B has a strong preference for Y and imports a great deal of it, 
this price change would worsen its terms of trade. 
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In case (b), on the other hand, the result depends crucially on which of its 
imports country C chooses to protect. If it protects good X, which both it 
and country B import from A, then as in case (a) this will lower world 
demand for X, lower its price, and improve the terms of trade of both LDCs. 
But if it protects instead good Y, which it imports from B, then it is good Y 
whose price will fall and country B clearly loses. In general, if C protects 
both X and Y, then the effect on B's terms of trade is ambiguous, depending 
on the sizes of protection of the two goods, plus various elasticities of supply 
and demand and the initial quantities traded. 
Thus, the neighborhood effects of protection, unlike their effects on the rest 
of the world as a whole, can easily be either positive or negative, depending 
on the particular patterns of trade that prevail and perhaps also on other 
parameters of behavior. The result cannot be predicted clearly and simply in 
theoretical terms, s and must be examined in the context of a model in which 
all these factors can be made explicit and based on empirical observations. 
Thus it is a natural problem to address using a computable general 
equilibrium model of trade and protection. This will lead us, later in the 
paper, to use the Michigan model for this purpose. First, however, we will 
examine our data directly to see if they offer any clues as to which of the 
possible outcomes is most likely. 
3. Sample data on developing country protection 
We have been working for some time to assemble, and assimilate into a 
computerized data base, a mass of published information regarding tariffs 
and NTBs around the world. 6 While our effort is still incomplete, we have 
used the facility being developed to process a sample of data for use in this 
paper. From a variety of sources, we have data on protection in several 
LDCs. Since, because of their diverse sources, these data are reported for 
different industry classification schemes, we have used our computer facility 
to concord all of them into the classification system used in the Michigan 
model. 7 The results of the procedure are reported in table 1. 
sit is not difficult to add more countries to the Same theoretical framework. Thus, depending 
upon the number and size of countries and whether their protection is coordinated or not, their 
terms of trade may improve or decline with protection. 
6Our ongoing efforts also include an annotated bibliography of the literature dealing with the 
theoretical analysis and empirical measurement and effects of NTBs. 
7Using the published industry and product names, we constructed concordances from each 
classification system used in the sources to 4-digit ISIC - International Standard Industrial 
Classification - categories. The published tariff and NTB data were mapped via these 
concordances and then averaged up to the 1- and 3-digit ISIC categories of the Michigan model 
using the respective countries' imports as weights. Import data were taken from 1976 United 
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As can be seen, our data cover nine developing countries, which we call 
the 'focus' countries, for a variety of years during the 1960s. s The focus 
countries have been chosen from the group of 16 newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) which are included in the Michigan model. As indicated, 
some of the data refer only to nominal tariffs. In other cases, we have reports 
of 'implicit' tariffs that attempt to include the ad valorem equivalents of 
NTBs, as inferred from comparisons of domestic and international priceS. 9 In 
addition, for Brazil, we have something called 'product protection', in which 
nominal tariffs have been augmented by explicit measures of certain NTBs 
that were available, such as exchange premia, port charges, etc. 
These data are of course rather old, and they differ considerably among 
themselves in the extent to which they include NTBs in their coverage. Still, 
they provide a useful glimpse of how LDC protection can vary across 
industries and countries, and therefore a starting point for an analysis of how 
protection in these countries affects one another. 
It is clear from these data that protection was substantial, and also that in 
most of the countries it varied greatly across sectors. Thus there is 
considerable scope for these levels of protection to have differential effects 
across industries that could in turn show up as terms-of-trade effects of the 
sort discussed above. Before using the Michigan model to calculate such 
terms-of-trade effects, however, we shall undertake a direct analysis of the 
data themselves. 
4. Direct comparison of protection 
We saw that a country's structure of protection might benefit another 
country to the extent that the two countries share similar patterns of both 
trade and protection. In table 2 we report correlations that attempt to gauge 
this similarity. The table has three panels, the first of which reports a matrix 
of correlations between each pair of the nine columns of table 1. The second 
and third panels report similar correlations among vectors of export shares 
and import shares. 
Looking first at the correlations among levels of protection, more of these 
are positive than negative. Of the eight possible correlations that can be 
reported for each of the nine focus countries, only Turkey has four positive 
and four negative, and even here the positive correlations tend to be  the 
larger. At the other extreme is Brazil, whose levels of protection are 
positively correlated with protection in each of the other eight countries. All 
of this gives some weak indication that protection in the countries might spill 
over positively in terms of its effects on the others in the group. 
SWe are currently in the process of gathering more recent information on protection in DCs 
and LDCs to be incorporated into our data base. Details are available on request. 
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This impression becomes stronger when we look at the correlations among 
trade shares in the next two panels of table 2, in which we have correlated 
vectors of exports as a share of industry domestic production and vectors of 
imports as a share of industry domestic demand. 1° Again, especially for the 
export shares, the correlations are largely positive. Thus it seems likely that if 
one country's protection raises the world prices of its exports and/or lowers 
the world prices of its imports, the others in the group will share in the 
benefit. 
These results, however, deal only with comparisons among levels of 
protection alone and among levels of trade alone. They do not get at the 
equally important question of how one country's protection compares to 
another's trade. That is, are these countries' tariffs and other forms of 
protection biased towards or away from the exports of their neighbors? We 
try to answer this question in table 3. 
Here we report various export-weighted averages of each country's levels 
of protection from table 1. For example, in column one of table 3, Brazil's 
measures of 'product protection' have been averaged. The first average uses 
Chile's exports as weights and yields an average level of product protection 
of only 25 percent. This is quite small, as a result of Brazil's zero level of 
protection reported for non-ferrous metals, which is the industry where Chile 
happens to concentrate the bulk of its exports. In contrast, BraWl's average 
level of protection using Colombia's exports as weights is much larger, 96 
percent. Colombia, evidently, exports a higher proportion of the goods that 
Brazil protects. Indeed, this average is even higher in other countries, 
reaching a high of 127 percent using South Korean exports as weights. 
Further down in table 3, averages are reported that use exports of certain 
developed countries (DCs) and regions as weights. What is most interesting 
here, perhaps, is the comparison of the average based on all sixteen LDCs' 
exports versus that based on all eighteen DCs. For six of the nine focus 
countries, protection against LDC exports is larger than against DC exports. 
The difference is quite noticeable in the cases of Brazil and Chile, and also 
Taiwan and Turkey. In only three countries, Colombia, India and Mexico, is 
protection lower against other LDCs, and of these the difference is marked 
only in Colombia. 
Thus, these averages of protection in table 3 tell a different story than the 
simple correlations in table 2. Several countries seem to protect more heavily 
against the exports of their LDC neighbors than they do against the exports 
of developed countries. This suggests therefore that the erection of these 
trade barriers should have worsened the terms of trade of their neighbors, 
and thus that the neighborhood effects of their protection would be negative. 
1°We used these shares instead of total trade to avoid misleading correlations that could 
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Together, then, these pieces of evidence derived from direct examination of 
the data on trade and protection leave a mixed impression. It is unclear what 
to expect from the more elaborate analysis to come. This is just as well, 
perhaps, since we would have reason to doubt the message of such simple 
comparisons as these in any case, given the complications that we know can 
be introduced by the sorts of general equilibrium interactions that are 
accounted for in the Michigan model. 
5. Description of the Michigan model and its application 
The Michigan model of world production and trade is well suited to the 
analysis of the issues in this paper. It was developed originally to analyze the 
economic effects of the Tokyo Round, and we have since used it for a variety 
of other issues. 11 Space does not permit a full presentation and discussion of 
the model, but a brief description may nonetheless be useful. 12 
The model incorporates supply and demand functions and market-clearing 
conditions for the 29 industries and 34 countries listed in table 4. National 
and world markets determine equilibrium prices and quantities traded and 
produced, plus the flexible exchange rates. Labor-demand functions also 
determine employment in each industry and country. We abstract from such 
macroeconomic determinants of aggregate employment as levels of govern- 
ment spending, taxes and the money stock. Instead, nominal wages are held 
fixed and aggregate expenditure is adjusted endogenously to stabilize ag- 
gregate employment in each country. 
Supply and demand functions were derived from maximization of profit 
and utility functions. These in turn were selected so as to permit a rich 
variety of behavior, but also to have parameters that could be either readily 
observed from available data or inferred from published econometric esti- 
mates. The current model uses a base of 1976 data on trade, production, 
and employment. To describe technology, we use the 1972 input-output 
table for the U.S. and the 1970 national tables for the individual EEC- 
member countries, Japan, and Brazil. The remaining industrialized and 
developing countries are described by the U.S. and Brazilian tables respec- 
tively. 13 Estimates of import-demand elasticities and elasticities of capital- 
labor substitution were obtained from the literature. 14 
11See Deardorff and Stern (1986) for details on these various applications of the model. 
12The model is presented in detail in Deardorff and Stern (1981, 1986). 
13This use of one country's I -O table to describe technology in another is a drawback 
imposed by current limitations in our available data. We have examined the si~mificance of using 
different I -O tables in the model in Deardorff and Stern (1985b). 
14With one exception, supply elasticities for both export and domestic sales are derived from 
the asssumed production functions using these estimates of capital-labor substitution, together 
with labor and value-added shares from the input-output tables. The exception is the petroleum 
and related products industry, ISIC 35B, where on that basis the supply elasticity would be 
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Table 4 
Countries and industries of the model. 
Country Country Industry ISIC Industry 
name abbreviation name ~ code abbreviation 
Industrialized countries ~aded goods 
Australia ALA Agr., for., & fish. 1 Agric 
Austria ATA Food, bey., & tob. 310 Food 
Canada CND Textiles 321 Text 
European Community ,Wearing apparel 322 Appar 
Belgium-Luxembourg BLX Leather products 323 Leath 
Denmark DEN Footware 324 Shoes 
France FR Wood products 331 Wood 
Germany GFR Furniture & fixt. 332 Furn 
Ireland IRE Paper & paper prod. 341 Paper 
Italy IT Printing & publ. 342 Print 
The Netherlands NL Chemicals 35A Chem 
United Kingdom UK Petrol. & tel. prod. 35B Petro 
Finland FIN Rubber products 355 Rubb 
Japan JPN Nonmetal. min. prod. 36A Pott 
New Zealand NZ Glass & glass prod. 362 Glass 
Norway NOR Iron & steel 371 Iron 
Sweden SWD Nonferrous metals 372 Nonfe 
Switzerland SWZ Metal products 381 Metal 
United States US Nonelec. machinery 382 Mach 
Developing countries Elec. machinery 383 Elec 
Argentina ARG Transport equip. 384 Vehic 
Brazil BRZ Misc. mannfact. 38A Other 
Chile CHL Non-traded goods 
Colombia COL Mining & quarrying 2 Mine 
Greece GRC Elec., gas, & water 4 Util 
Hong Kong HK Construction 5 Const 
India IND Whole. & retail trade 6 W&rtl 
Israel ISR Transp., stor., & comm. 7 Trans 
South Korea SK Fin., insur., & real est. 8 Finan 







An important feature of the model is its partial use of the Armington 
(1969) assumption that goods are differentiated by country of origin. This is 
a standard feature of computable trade models, making them consistent with 
empirical estimates of import elasticities and the fact that countries record 
implausibly high in many countries. In that industry we have assumed instead that the dollar 
price is essentially fixed by a very large elasticity of supply with respect to that price for exports 
from the rest-of-world sector, while supplies within the included countries of the model are given 
an elasticity of near zero. 
J.D.E.-- E 
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both exports and imports in the same industry. In our implementation, 
demanders distinguish between imports and domestic goods, but not among 
imports from different sources abroad. Also, we assume separate domestic 
and export supply functions in each industry. These assumptions together 
capture much of the flavor of the full Armington assumption, without its 
computational complexity. However, as we will note below, our particular 
formulation may influence the size of the terms-of-trade effects that are 
generated by our model. 
Regarding trade policies in the model, these appear in several forms. First 
we model tariffs as exogenous ad valorem taxes on imports. Second, another 
exogenous variable in each tradable industry can capture the change in a 
quantitative restriction on imports if the size of that change is known. Third, 
the model contains parameters to reflect the continued presence of quantita- 
tive restrictions in the various sectors when other changes occur in the model. 
These parameters are important for capturing the role that many NTBs play 
in reducing the price responsiveness of trade below what it would otherwise 
be. We have selected values for them in the DCs based primarily upon an 
inventory of quantitative restrictions in Murray and Walter (1978). Finally, 
lacking comprehensive data on quantitative restrictions in LDCs, we have for 
most purposes modeled them as using a system of import licensing to 
allocate scarce foreign exchange. 
In the current application of the model, we wish to calculate the effects of 
the levels of protection reported in table 1. Some of these data implicitly 
include quantitative restrictions, but they are measured as ad valorem 
equivalents and we have no information as to their direct quantitative effects. 
We therefore model all LDC protection as implemented by tariffs. We 
continue, however, to assume the presence of quantitative restrictions in the 
DCs. 
6. The neighborhood effects of protection 
To examine the neighborhood effects of protection, we did ten runs of the 
model. Nine were concerned with protection in each of the nine focus 
countries separately, while the tenth looked at protection in all nine 
simultaneously. In each case, the model was used, starting from a base of free 
trade in the LDCs, to calculate the effects of instituting the levels of 
protection reported in table 1. 
We wished to direct attention to the levels of protection themselves, and 
not factor in accidentally the effects of endogenous changes in disequilibrium 
exchange rates or exchange controls. We therefore ran the model under the 
assumption of perfectly flexible exchange rates in all the LDCs, even though 
this is manifestly inappropriate as a description of what have been the 
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exchange re~mes in most of these countries in recent years. 15 On the other 
hand, to the extent that aspects of exchange rate management such as import 
licensing have introduced divergences between domestic and world prices in 
these countries, these divergences are taken into account in those of our data 
on protection that are labelled implicit tariffs. Thus to some extent our 
analysis includes the effects one might expect from a liberalization of 
exchange regimes. In any case, it seems better to make the assumption of a 
well functioning exchange market than to make the alternative assumption 
that protection can and would be permanently prevented from having its full 
general equilibrium effects. 
These runs of the model produced a large amount of information about 
the effects of protection on various variables, both within the protecting 
countries and elsewhere. Most of this information is extraneous to our 
central purpose here, which is to consider the terms-of-trade effects of 
protection for each of the countries. This is of interest because, as explained 
above, it is primarily through the terms of trade that protection in one 
country can affect welfare in another. We do not report results for welfare 
per se, since certain aspects of our model make meaningful welfare calcu- 
lations difficult, but we will conclude with some discussion of how complete 
welfare effects would differ from those indicated by the terms of trade alone. 
Table 5, then, reports effects on the terms of trade. Each column refers to a 
different run of the model, in which protection is installed in the country 
indicated at the top of the column. The column headed 'All' reports the 
effects of adding protection in all nine focus countries at once. The rows 
contain effects on the terms of trade of the countries listed at the left. These 
are calculated, from the solution of the model, as the change in an index of 
world prices weighted by each country's exports, minus the change in such 
an index weighted by its imports. The numbers reported are in percentage 
terms, and are very small. Most interesting are their signs, which indicate 
whether neighborhood effects are positive or negative. In addition, their 
relative sizes allow comparison of own-country versus cross-country effects 
and the effects of individual country protection versus that of all nine focus 
countries together. 
The top portion of table 5 reports effects of focus country protection on 
the focus countries themselves. Thus the diagonal of this portion of the table 
indicates the terms-of-trade effect of each country's own protection, and as 
one would expect these values are all positive. 
The off-diagonai elements of this portion of the table are the neighborhood 
effects among the focus countries alone. These tend to be positive, but are 
not positive in every case. While the terms-of-trade effects of protection by 
15Also ' with flexible exchange rates, there is no need to use the system of import licensing that 
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Brazil, Colombia, India, Mexico, and Turkey are almost all positive for the 
other focus countries, protection by Chile, Israel, South Korea and Taiwan 
has negative effects in a number of cases. By and large these neighborhood 
effects tend to be positive, but not uniformly so. 
These results extend for the most part to the other LDCs of the model, as 
shown somewhat further down in the table, but they are reversed, as one 
would expect, for the DCs. There are a great many negative terms-of-trade 
effects reported for the DCs. 
Taken as a group in the last column of table 5, protection by all the focus 
countries together improves the terms of trade of each of them. This 
improvement extends to all other LDCs as well except for Singapore, whose 
terms-of-trade deterioration seems to result almost exclusively from protec- 
tion in Brazil. Even several DCs experience terms-of-trade improvement as a 
result of the collective focus-country protection, but the terms of trade of the 
largest developed countries - France, Germany, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S. 
- respond negatively. 
Thus we conclude that protection in each of several LDCs, as reflected in 
the particular data from the 1960s that we had available, does tend to be 
reinforcing. That is, these countries achieve a modest improvement in their 
terms of trade as a result of this protection, at the expense, evidently, of their 
largest DC trading partners. 
This is important since it means that terms-of-trade improvement, which is 
the one clear economic benefit that can be derived from protection in 
traditional analysis of trade theory, is not being undermined in the LDCs by 
the effects of their protection on each other. 16 We should stress, however, 
that this does not  mean that the overall effects of protection are desirable for 
these countries. We have reported only the terms-of-trade effects here, and it 
is likely that the other adverse effects of protection would outweigh them. 
These adverse effects all have to do with the protecting country itself, and 
are precisely the efficiency effects alluded to in section 2. That is, protection 
causes domestic consumers and producers to face prices that are different 
from the terms of trade of the country itself, and thus distorts their decisions 
away from what would have been optimal given that terms of trade. The 
standard result of international trade theory is that these efficiency effects 
cause the net loss by producers and consumers due to protection to be larger 
than any revenue or rents that can be derived from that protection. Thus, 
aside from beneficial effects on the terms of trade, countries tend to lose by 
imposing protection. 
In the cases examined here, the terms-of-trade improvement that can be 
obtained by protection in LDCs is extremely small, as one would expect 
16For a critical discussion of other benefits that have been suggested as arising from 
protection, see Deardorff and Stern (1985a). 
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from the small role that each of these countries plays in world markets. In 
these circumstances it is almost inevitable that the adverse efficiency effects of 
protection are larger than the terms-of-trade improvement. 
There are some qualifications to this that should perhaps be mentioned, 
however. First, the standard analysis of the welfare effects of protection 
assumes balanced trade, and this is not a valid assumption for the countries 
looked at here. While it is not clear how analysis of welfare should be 
modified in the presence of unbalanced trade, some preliminary calculations 
that we have done with our model suggest that these trade imbalances may 
be somewhat important. 
A second qualification relates to a feature of our model that is not shared 
by some other computable trade models and that seems to be important in 
determining terms-of-trade effects. As noted in section 5, in our partial 
implementation of the Armington assumption buyers do not distinguish 
among imports from different countries. Other models, such as Whalley 
(1984) and Brown (1984), have incorporated the full Armington assumption 
and have tended to find larger terms-of-trade effects than we typically find 
with our model. 
Brown (1984) has argued that the reason for this difference is tl~at, in our 
model, exporters compete with all other exporters of the same good while, 
with the full Armington assumption, each country's exporters have a market 
of their own. We agree with this assessment and recognize therefore that our 
terms-of-trade effects might be underestimates. On the other hand, lacking 
information on elasticities of substitution between imported goods from 
different sources, we are not convinced that the complete Armington 
formulation, if used without differentiating these elasticities, is preferable to 
our own. It seems unlikely, especially, that small LDCs are able to 
differentiate their products sufficiently to acquire much influence over their 
terms of trade. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper we have looked at how protection in LDCs affects welfare in 
other countries, particularly their economic neighbors, the other LDCs. We 
found first in theoretical terms that the answer could go either way, 
depending on whether the countries share similar structures of trade and 
protection. Thus the question is an empirical one, and we were led to base 
our analysis on a sample of data on protection in nine LDCs. 
The data themselves offered conflicting messages concerning this issue. On 
the one hand, there were generally positive correlations among patterns of 
protection in the various countries for which we had data, and we found 
even stronger positive correlations for the data on trade. However, when we 
combined the data on protection and trade to see how they match up, we 
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found a tendency for the focus countries to protect more heavily against the 
exports of other LDCs than against DC exports. 
We therefore used the Michigan model of world production and trade to 
do a more careful calculation of what this protection implies for the terms of 
trade of the countries of the world. We found that protection by our focus 
countries tended to have positive terms-of-trade effects on other countries 
within the group, and negative effects for many DCs. That is, there was some 
tendency for the neighborhoo~i effects of these countries' protection to be 
positive. This effect is very small, however, and cannot be expected to 
outweigh the efficiency losses that protection entails within the LDCs 
themselves. 
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